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Guest post by Gail Tverberg of Our Finite World

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) recently released full-year 2011 world oil production data. In this post, I would like show some graphs of recent data, and provide some views as to where this leads with respect to future production.

World oil supply is not growing very much

Figure 1. World crude oil and other “liquids” supply has dropped below the 1983-2005 trend line in recent years. Actual data is from EIA International Petroleum Monthly, through December 2011.

The fitted line in Figure 1 suggests a “normal” growth in oil supplies (including substitutes) of 1.6% a year, based on the 1983 to 2005 pattern, or total growth of 10.2% between 2005 and 20011. Instead of 10.2%, actual growth between 2005 and 2010 amounted to only 3.0% including crude oil and substitutes.

The shortfall in oil production relative to what would  have been expected based on the 1983-2005 growth pattern amounted to 4.7 million barrels in 2011. This is far more than any country claims as spare capacity. This is no doubt one of the reasons why oil prices are as high they are now. These high oil prices tend to interfere with economic growth of oil importing nations.

The shortfall in growth especially occurred in crude oil. Figure 2, below, shows crude oil production separately from substitutes.

Figure 2. World oil and other liquids supply, broken out into crude and condensate, natural gas plant liquids, other liquids (mostly ethanol), and processing gain (increase in volume from refining heavy oil), based on EIA data.

Between 2005 and 2011, crude oil production rose only 0.5%. It was mostly the substitutes that grew.

 

Top Oil Producers

The top five crude oil producers in 2011, based on the new data are

  1. Russia – 9.8 million barrels a day (mbd)
  2. Saudi Arabia – 9.5 mbd
  3. United States – 5.7 mbd
  4. China – 4.1 mbd
  5. Iran – 4.1 mbd

The top five producers when substitute liquids of various kinds are included are the same countries, but in a different order. On this basis, the US also appears to be closer to catching up to the top two.

  1. Saudi Arabia – 11.2 mbd
  2. Russia – 10.2 mbd
  3. United States – 10.1 mbd
  4. China – 4.3 mbd
  5. Iran – 4.2 mbd

While substitute liquids are OK, they are not really crude oil. Natural gas liquids are the largest category. In the US, they sell for a little less than half as much as crude oil, based on the composition and costs shown in this post. On an energy content basis, they provide about 70% as much energy per barrel as crude oil.

“Other liquids” has also been growing. It is mostly ethanol, which has about 60% of the energy content of crude oil per barrel. This category also includes biodiesel, liquid fuels made from coal or from natural gas, and even a mixture of water with very heavy oil called “Orinoco emulsion“.

There is also growth in “processing gain”.  This term refers to the extra volume that is gained when long hydrocarbons of heavy oil are”cracked” into shorter molecules. The EIA assigns this growth back to the country doing the refining. The US comes out ahead in this comparison because it imports a lot of heavy oil, and uses its complex refineries to crack it into shorter chains, such as diesel fuel and gasoline. If the heavy oil imports were to go to another country with complex refineries (such as China), the processing gain would go with it.

Looking at the Top Five Oil Producers

Of the top five oil producers, only the US and China have been growing very rapidly, and  China’s growth now seems to be hitting limits. Let’s look at the five largest countries individually.

Russian Oil Production

Between 2005 and 2011, Russia’s oil production (including substitutes) grew by 7.5%. This is better than the world average of 3.0%, but still falls short of the expected growth between 2005 and 2011 of 10.2%, mentioned above, based on the 1983 to 2005 world growth pattern.

Figure 3. Russia oil and other liquids production based on EIA data.

In 2011, Russia’s crude oil production grew by 0.6%. Growth may be slowing even further in the future. Russian Economic Minister, Elvira Nabiullina, was recently quoted as saying that Russia’s possibilities for crude oil growth have been exhausted and that Russia’s oil output will stabilize at the 2011 level for the next 20 years.

Saudi Arabian Oil Production

Figure 4 (below) shows that Saudi Arabia’s oil production has not increased much on an annual basis since 2005.

Figure 4. Saudi Arabia oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Looking at crude oil only, Saudi Arabia’s production is down by 0.8% since 2005. If one includes natural gas plant liquids (mostly ethanepropane, and butane), Saudi Arabia’s oil production for the year 2011 is up by 0.6% since 2005. This is less than the world average of 3.0%.

Saudi Arabia’s oil production bounces around. Admittedly, for some individual months, Saudi Arabia has broken its own record for crude oil production, but there is no pattern of continuously increasing production, such as is needed to increase world oil supply.

United States Oil Production

US oil production is growing (total liquids supply increased by 21.2% between 2005 and 2011), but the major portion of the growth is coming from oil substitutes.

Figure 5. US oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

A comparison of the thickness of non-blue bands on the US graph with those of the world (Figure 2) and with other countries shows how disproportionate the US mixture is.

If we look at US crude oil production by area of the country, we see that while Bakken production in North Dakota has been growing, it is still a small proportion of US total production.

Figure 6. US crude oil production by area, based on EIA data.

Before the shale oil rush, the biggest growth in US oil production had been from what I have called “deepwater”(what is called “Federal Offshore” in the EIA data). This production is down by over 200,000 barrels a day in 2011, more than double the growth in North Dakota production.

The other recent area of oil production growth is Texas. While EIA data does not break the production out by field, higher production from the Eagle Ford shale and the Permian Basin are likely major contributors.

China’s Oil Production

China’s oil production plateaued in 2011, after many years of strong growth.

Figure 7. China oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Figure 7 shows that China’s oil production for 2011 slightly decreased. The Financial Times recently reported that part of the problem is an outage of over 150,000 barrels a day in the Penglai 19-3 field, which reduced production starting in September 2011, but is now coming back on line. But even apart from this, China is reported to be  struggling to find new production to offset declines in aging fields. The Financial Times calls the outlook “challenging”.

If China’s oil production fails to grow in the future, or declines, it means that China will need to import even more oil than it has in the recent past. This will put even more pressure on world oil supply.

Iran’s Oil Production

Iran is constantly in the news with discussions of more sanctions and the possibility of  cutting off Iran’s oil exports. While it is listed above as fifth in world oil production, it is almost tied with China for fourth in world oil production.

Figure 8. Iran oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Iran’s oil production hit a high point in 2005, and is down slightly from that level. Its exports are down even more:

Figure 8. Crude oil and natural gas liquids production (gray), consumption (black line) and exports (green). Data is from BP, and only through 2010. Graph from Energy Export Data Browser.

The fact that Iran’s oil production is not growing is no doubt one of the reasons it is interested in electricity production from nuclear energy.

In my view, Iran’s oil exports of over 2 million barrels a day are very much needed to maintain reasonable stability in world oil prices. We would be better off finding a different way to settle our differences with Iran than cutting off exports.

Other Areas of Interest

The North Sea has been a problem area, with declining production. EIA data does not show this grouping separate. Instead it shows data for Europe in total.

Europe has surprisingly low oil production. On a crude oil basis, Europe’s 2011 production is below that of Iran (3.4 mbd for Europe, and 4.1 mbd for Iran). With the various substitutes included, Europe’s production is approximately equal to that of China – 4.3 mbd, and slightly ahead of Iran’s at 4.2 mbd.

Figure 9. Europe oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Clearly Europe has a very serious problem with falling oil production. In 2011 alone, crude oil production was down by 8.9%, and more broadly defined liquids were down by 7.4%. Europe’s declining oil production is no doubt contributing to it financial problems.

In contrast to Europe, there are a number of bright spots with respect to world oil supply.

Canada’s oil supply is increasing:

Figure 10. Canada oil and other liquids supply, based on EIA data.

Of course, one of the issues relating to Canada is that quite a bit of the increase is from the oil sands. This production is of concern for environmental reasons.

The Former Soviet Union excluding Russia is another area where production has been increasing, at least until recently.

Figure 11. Former Soviet Union (FSU) excluding oil and other liquids supply, based on EIA data.

The graph would seem to suggest that production may have plateaued in this area, as well.

Qatar is a small country, but is showing rapidly increasing production from a small base:

Figure 12. Qatar oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Iraq is often mentioned as an area which may have increased production in the future.

Figure 13. Iraq oil and other liquids production based on EIA data.

Figure 13 shows that there really hasn’t been a huge increase in production so far. Past history is so unstable that it raises questions about Iraq’s ability to ramp up production in the future.

Libya is mentioned as having a possibility of increasing production, at least relative to the drop off in 2011.

Figure 14. Libya oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

While some increase from the 800,000 barrels a day production that EIA shows for December seems likely, it may never fully get back to its old level. A recent analysis says Oil Production Still Unstable in Libya. According to this article, security concerns are likely to hold back future investment by outside companies in Libyan production, and sluggish political decision-making is likely to hold back actions of Libya’s National Oil Company.

Various African countries are mentioned from time to time as providing new sources of production. But when we look at African production, excluding that of Libya, we see that at least so far, African production, excluding Libya, is on a plateau.

Figure 15. Africa excluding Libya oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Brazil is also mentioned as a growth opportunity.

Figure 16. Brazil oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

The actual increases to date have been small, however. Crude oil production in 2011 increased by only about 51,000 barrels a day over 2010. Ethanol production decreased, so that total liquids production decreased slightly in 2011.

Conclusions

It is easy to find small opportunities where it looks possible to increase oil production, but on a world-wide basis, it appears likely that at best, very slow growth will continue. The oil production of China and Russia were previously increasing, but now seem to be hitting plateaus. Even smaller groupings, such as the FSU excluding Russia, seem to be hitting plateaus.

Future prospects for oil supply look to be worse, especially if Iranian exports are taken off line, or if there are unexpected surprises on the downside. One concern is that political disruptions may take oil production offline in additional countries. Anther is that financial disruptions (perhaps related to European debt defaults) may lead to lower oil prices, cutting off some marginal supply.

On balance, it would appear that at best oil production in the near future will be virtually flat, leading to more spiking of oil prices and greater world economic problems. Another possibility is that world production will begin to decline. The likelihood of decline would appear to be increased if more oil exporters encounter political disruptions, or if the world enters a major recession leading to an oil price decline.

Barrons interview with Hugh Hendry:

The world is very fearful of hyperinflation. Pension schemes have a preponderance of real assets, from forestry to gold to TIPS [Treasury inflation-protected securities], because they are very fearful. The road to hyperinflation is via hyperdeflation. That is why it’s proving so difficult for hedge funds to make money. How does the rational mind that anticipates hyperinflation own 10-year government Treasuries yielding less than 2%? It can’t. That’s why people are struggling. To lay the seeds of hyperinflation, you need really, really bad things to happen. I thought the U.S. housing market having a massive crash would be hyperdeflationary. But then my Chinese friends pumped $1 trillion of credit into their $5 trillion economy, and created a global recovery, which has just come to an end. I’m speculating that hyperdeflation happens before hyperinflation. What’s the worst that could happen? But the sum of all my fears would be China having a real hard landing of minus 5% or minus 10% GDP growth. If we had that—and Europe—the Fed would be printing $20 trillion, and I would have gold at $5,000. You can have a modest amount of gold, but you can’t have all your assets in real assets, in case we get that hyperdeflation event.

Read the full article

“By manipulating the yield curve, and pushing interest rates negative in real terms, the Federal Reserve is distorting the space-time continuum, and making it profitable for individuals and businesses to make investment decisions that may not seem so intelligent if the world is still around in the future. Ironically, the suppression of interest rates, if it goes far enough, could make the destruction of the future profitable, and so actualize the very thing that its policies reward. Ironically, this is something that IMF chief Christine Lagarde seems to be aware of. She is on record saying that low interest rates have decreased the number of available risk-free, or nearly riskless assets available for investment.”

Subprime lending coming back, says the New York Times:

Annette Alejandro just emerged from bankruptcy and doesn’t have a job, and her car was repossessed last year. Still, after spending her days job hunting, she returns to her apartment in Brooklyn where, in disbelief, she sorts through the piles of credit card and auto loan offers that have come in the mail.

“Even I wouldn’t make a loan to me at this point,” Ms. Alejandro said.

Plan B Economics Presents – The End of Civilization and the Extinction of Humanity

I try to post interesting commentaries, from other analysts, that aren’t supplied by the mainstream media. Sometimes I sneak in a snide remark or two (I used to write a lot more, before work got in the way). However, aside from my editorial slant, many don’t know what I believe.

Well, here are a few (more to come later) of my basic thoughts on our empire as it stands on the ledge considering the plunge it is about to take…in one big, wet, sloppy nutshell:

1. The world economy might be on an intermediate period of growth, despite the troubles that loom. It might not feel like much of a recovery because we’re clawing out of a deep hole, but we are moving in the right direction for now. Data supports the claim that we are in a fragile recovery. In fact, many parts of the world have experienced strong recoveries and have already surpassed previous peaks.

2. Also in the intermediate term, debt crises will flare up to wreak havoc on the growth momentum. Europe might be the epicenter for a while, but eventually focus will shift to Japan, the world’s 3rd largest economy. Japan’s debt is unsustainable. Worse, spending is largely funded by cheap borrowing from Japanese citizens who are saving less and less. Thus, as Japan is forced to compete with the rest of the world for capital rates will likely rise, exacerbating the Japanese fiscal deficit. And the death spiral begins.

Japan will likely debase the Yen (hyperinflation?) to fill the fiscal void and global liquidity could rise dramatically. Once Japan goes, all eyes will be on the US.

While this sounds wildly contradictory to #1, we have been living with a smoldering debt crisis for many years. It is quite possible that we ‘kick the can down the road’ for a few more years. We may in fact muddle through these debt crises with some combination of financial repression and real growth. Stranger things have happened.

3. Given the current trajectory, US imperialism is doomed to dilution by rising powers around the world – China, Russia and regional allegiances. Dollar hegemony will suffer as a result, accelerating the process. This will also amplify the progression of any US debt crisis. Note the pro-cyclicality of the end of empire.

4. Now for the overriding theme: the end of cheap oil. It is no coincidence that the prosperity of the 1980s and 1990s occurred while commodity prices were declining. Cheaper inputs means fatter profit margins, providing the impetus for growth.

In 2002 the oil price was about $20bbl for WTI. Today it is around $100bbl. And what has the past decade brought? We may still have oil, but the cheap stuff is vanishing fast. When Saudi Arabia reveals its true reserves the world will see who has been swimming naked. EVERYONE.

The Western world mainlines cheap oil; without it industrialization and civilization easily falls apart. The gains of the past 200 years are based on the discovery of increasingly efficient sources of energy. Those gains include the following: mass agriculture, transportation, plastics, pharmaceuticals, electronics, mining and refining of other commodities, electricity production (because oil is used in coal mining, dam maintenance, gas extraction processes), mass communications, mass production, imported goods, and so on. Oh, and everything gets way more expensive. This doesn’t mean that all these things vanish – it just becomes scarce, which is worse.

In the battle between physics and economics, physics always wins. But this won’t stop mankind from going down without a fight. We will try to borrow and print our way out – as we have throughout modern history. We will also keep the rest of the world from accessing what many neoconsevatives believe is rightfully ours.

This should not come as a shock – the Anglo-American alliance has done this for over a century. Nevertheless, our efforts will be wasted and with it the resources needed to bridge to a new source of energy. For we live in a world in which it takes energy to get energy.

Those who build self-sufficiency now will survive best. Those who feed their black crack addiction with debt accumulation, conspicuous consumption and a paper-pushing career will suffer most.

More later…

Great job!

IceCap Asset Management Limited Global Markets March 2012

Artemis Capital Q12012_Volatility at World’s End

The recession of 1937—A cautionary tale

Apr 092012

From Time Magazine:

The outward sign of the change is an economy that stubbornly refuses to recover from the recession. In a normal rebound, Americans would be witnessing a flurry of hiring, new investment and lending, and buoyant growth. But the U.S. economy remains almost comatose a full year and a half after the recession officially ended. Unemployment is still high; real wages are declining. At a TIME economic forum last week, forecasters predicted that U.S. growth would amount to only 1.8% this year and 2.6% for next, about half the speed of a normal recovery. The current slump already ranks as the longest period of sustained weakness since the Great Depression.

That was the last time the economy staggered under as many “structural” burdens, as opposed to the familiar “cyclical” problems that create temporary recessions once or twice a decade. The structural faults represent once-in-a-lifetime dislocations that will take years to work out.

This excerpt is from an article written in 1992!

Think about the future that existed after this article was published. America experienced one of the greatest booms ever, but you would never have thought this possible after reading the article.

All economic recoveries are jobless. Companies don’t hire before business improves. If you ran a bakery, would you commit to a new hire in anticipation of more potential customers? Or would you wait until you see the sales numbers rise before hiring someone?

This time around we’re digging out of a bigger hole, so it feels like an even slower recovery and hiring will take longer to become recognizably strong. However, employment in America is gaining traction and, all things equal (Europe, oil, other shocks), the economy is in a painfully slow ascent. Albeit with the aid of government life support.

This is not to deny the existence of other latent problems that will eventually bite us in the arse: debt/deficit and rising commodity prices. But the existence of these issues don’t necessarily mean the US economy is in recession 100% of the time – at least not yet.

Catch him while you can. Russell Napier’s commentaries are infrequently found, but highly sought after.

In this audio interview:

-Chinese rebalancing hurts U.S. treasury purchases
-Governments will fund themselves by force
-Stocks & Bonds both overvalued (like in 1968)

Listen to the interview

Also, pick up Russell Napier’s book:


And this time, does it speak Spanish?

According to Slate:

Europanic is back in style. After a monthslong reprieve initiated by the European Central Bank’s decision to offer the continent’s banks nearly unlimited quantities of low-interest medium-term loans, the sovereign debt crisis has returned. This time ground zero is Spain rather than Italy, but the pattern is familiar. Interest rates on Spain’s debt went up a little, putting further strain on Spain’s budget. That called its solvency into question and pushed up rates further still. And as interest rates rise, Spanish banks’ viability comes into doubt, squeezing credit to the domestic economy and further weakening the budget. Depending on how you look at it, it’s a sovereign debt crisis, a banking crisis, or a simple growth crisis, but in any case, there is a risk of national default, total bank meltdown, and perhaps the collapse of the single currency or even the larger European project.

 

Apr 072012

Comment from a former USSR citizen on life after the Soviet coup:
“I lived in the Soviet Union very well. Worked at the factory for 150 rubles ($ 180) per month. Once a year, had a free trip to the sea, a trip to Moscow, I evaded $ 25, free education and medicine. Apartament as a gift from the state. I knew that tomorrow would be just as good as yesterday … what now? I work two jobs 12 hours a day, pay school, hospital, rent, do not dream about the sea. The usual needs of not enough money. I want the Soviet Union. Sorry for my English.”

Capitalism gone wrong becomes the enslavement of labor for the benefit of the capitalist class. However, the Soviet system failed in the same regard, despite its egalitarian ideals. Is equality possible? Or does the human condition make it a utopian dream?

The following documentary explores the 1991 coup that plucked the Soviet people from one nightmare only to be placed in another:

The fate of Europe depends on the Spanish economy…and signs point to a bust:

Given its size, the fate of the Spanish economy will also largely decide the fate of the euro. €80bn of €396bn (1/5) in loans that Spanish banks have made to the bust construction and real estate sectors is considered ‘doubtful’ and potentially toxic,meaning at serious risk of default, with the banks only holding €50bn in reserves to cover potential losses. Already dropping, house prices could potentially fall another35%, meaning that Spanish banks will almost certainly face hefty losses as more households default on their mortgages.

Spanish Banks Will Need Bailout