Custom Search

Recently Added Documentaries

Free Copy of “The Inflation Threat”

FREE eBook ($9.79 value):
"The Inflation Threat"

Wealth Creation eBook

Create Wealth

Guest post by Gail Tverberg of Our Finite World

Countries trade crude oil and oil products back and forth. When all of these transactions are netted out, is the US close to becoming a “net” oil exporter?

With the recent increase in oil production (perhaps even exceeding that of Russia on a “barrels-per-day” basis), a person might think that US oil production problems are behind us. If we look at the data, though, it is very clear that the US is still a long way from becoming a net oil exporter.

There are several reasons for confusion. One is the fact that excess refinery capacity can lead to the ability to export both gasoline and diesel, even though the United States continues to import large amounts of crude oil. Another is that tight oil (extracted through “fracking”) is growing from a small base, but can’t necessarily ramp up very far, very quickly. Another source of confusion is with respect to how different types of liquids should be combined for comparison purposes.

In this post, I would like to explain why the idea that the US is about to become a net oil exporter is simply a myth.

1. On what basis does the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) make forecasts of oil and other energy supplies?

When the EIA makes forecasts of oil and other supplies, as in its recently issued Annual Energy Outlook, Early Release 2012, it looks at future consumption and future supplies in terms of the amount of energy supplied in Btus. In doing this calculation, oil is combined with natural gas liquids. Biofuels (which in the case of the US are almost entirely corn ethanol) are treated separately, as part of “renewables”.

It seems to me that the EIA’s approach is about the only reasonable way of making comparisons, since it is energy value, and not volume (barrels-of-oil per day), that is important. Furthermore, if we are talking about oil imports and exports, we want to know about oil, perhaps including natural gas liquids (which are sort of like oil) by itself. Biofuels are a separate issue.

2. Where are we now, relative to being an oil exporter?

On a Btu basis, the US imported 58% of the oil it consumed in 2011. This percentage is down from a high of 67% in 2005 and 2006, but it is still very high.

Figure 1. US oil imports as a percentage of the oil consumed in the US – calculated using EIA Btu amounts for oil and natural gas liquids.

If the US wants to become an oil exporter, it must first get its imports down from 58% to 0%, and then ramp up production by enough to have oil to export as well.

3. What does the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecast regarding oil imports/exports?

In EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2012 Early Release, EIA gives the following forecast to 2035. (2010 and prior data are actual amounts.)

Figure 2. Comparison of forecast oil production (AEO Figure 12) and forecast oil consumption (AEO Figure 8), based on EIA’s AEO 2012 Early Release.

We can use the forecast in Figure 2 to create a graph similar to Figure 1, but with the EIA’s forecast included. Such a graph is shown as Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. AEO 2012 Forecast of Percentage of Oil Btus Imported

This graph indicates that while percentage of oil imported will drop a little (from 58% down to about 50% or 51%), the United States will not become an oil exporter before 2035.

4. How about if we make our own forecast regarding when we will become a net oil exporter, based on how consumption and production have been trending recently?

Yes, we can do this. I do this in Figure 4, below.

Figure 4. US oil production and consumption, based on recent trends. Historical data form EIA. Trends selected by author.

Based on this approach, if the US could keep up the current trend, we would become an oil exporter in 2028, which is 16 years from now. This result is better than the EIA’s forecast, but is still a long ways away.

5. Isn’t the production of tight oil, obtained by “fracking,” doing very well?

Yes, it is. According to the EIA’s This Week in Petroleum,  a graph of tight oil production by play is as shown in Figure 5, below. Tight oil is the oil that is typically extracted by horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. It comes from shale and other very-low-permeability rocks.

Figure 5. Tight oil production by play, from the EIA’s publication, “This Week in Petroleum,” March 14, 2012.

This graphic indicates that tight oil provided about 850,000 barrels a day of oil, as of November 2011. The United States consumes a little under 19 million barrels a day–lets say 18.5 million barrels a day.   The 850,000 barrels a day of tight oil amounts to a little less than 5% of the 18.5 million barrels a day we consume, so is only a small fraction of what we use today.

If we look at a graph of recent US crude oil production by area, this is what it looks like:

Figure 6. US crude oil production by area, based on EIA data.

Bakken tight oil is in North Dakota, which corresponds to the purple area in Figure 6 above. The Eagle Ford play (as well as some of the smaller plays) are in Texas, which is shown in red. At the same time these two sources of production increased, deepwater production decreased, so the total increase in US crude oil production was less than the increase in tight oil production.

We have a long-term problem with declining oil production on older fields (illustrated in Figure 6), so we can expect that such declines will continue. As a result, whatever new production we gain from tight oil or other new sources is likely to be offset by declines elsewhere. It is only to the extent that new production is greater than these declines that overall US production will rise.

6. Can’t we just keep ramping up the tight oil production, by drilling more?

We can probably ramp up production by drilling some more wells, but at some point we start running into limits of suitable horizontal drilling rigs and of trained workers.

Figure 7. EIA exhibit of rig counts by orientation, based on Baker-Hughes data. Exhibit from This Week in Petroleum, March 14, 2012.

The figure above shows that there has been a big shift in use of drilling rigs from gas to oil. Current Baker Hughes data shows that as of April 13, 2012, 32% of drilling rigs (vertical and horizontal combined) were gas and 68% were oil.  At some point not too far in the future, we end up being maxed out on how many horizontal drilling rigs can reasonably be transferred from gas to oil. More horizontal drilling rigs can be built, but this takes time and investment capital.

One characteristic of wells in tight formations is that production starts out very high, and then drops off quickly. Because of this, it is necessary to keep drilling new wells, or total production in an area is likely to drop off very quickly. New fracking techniques may help make the drop-off problem less severe, but it is hard to imagine that it will go away completely. If we want production to keep rising, this means that we are likely to need more and more horizontal drilling rigs, more and more fracking equipment, and more and more capital. These considerations help put a lid on how quickly and how high production can be ramped up.

7. How much tight oil does the EIA forecast can be extracted?

Figure 8. The brown layer on top represents the EIA’s forecast of future tight oil production. Graph by EIA, from AEO 2012.

The EIA forecasts that tight oil will max out at 1,325,000 barrels a day in 2030. The EIA does not have a good track record of foreseeing changes before they happen, and the chart above shows production already at 850,000 barrels a day. Suppose the US really produces five times as much as the EIA forecasts, or 6,625,000 barrels a day. This increase will still not be enough to cause the US to become a net oil exporter, especially if other sources of oil continue to decline. (This is not to say that I think that production can really be ramped up this much. We would likely run into a number of bottlenecks before reaching this volume–drilling rigs, workers, fracking equipment, capital, etc.)

8. Haven’t we been reading about exporting gasoline and other oil products recently? Does’t that mean we are becoming a net oil exporter?

Yes, indeed, we are exporting gasoline and other oil products to a greater extent than we have in the past.  But we continue to import crude oil, so, on balance, we are still a net oil importer.1

What has happened is that we have continued to add to our refinery capacity:

Figure 9. Operable crude oil refinery capacity. Chart by EIA.

At the same time, we have reduced our own need for gasoline and other products. One of the ways we have done this is by ramping up corn ethanol production. We are now producing so much ethanol that we are exporting some of it (Figure 10, below).

Figure 10. US Biofuels (nearly all ethanol) production and consumption, based on EIA data.

The other way consumption has been reduced by reducing the miles driven per capita (Figure 11, below).

Figure 11. US miles driven per capita, calculated by dividing Federal Highway Administration estimates of vehicle miles traveled (both cars and trucks) by US population.

The peak year for vehicle miles traveled per person was the year ended January 2006. (All of the data in the chart is for years ended January 20xx.) Since then, per capita vehicle miles driven have dropped each year, and are now 7.2% below their peak.

Total miles driven for the entire US population has also dropped. The peak year for total vehicle miles driven was the year ended January, 2008.

There may be other changes that affected oil use, but I don’t have data for them. For example, transferring heavy industry offshore would tend to reduce oil use; an increase in average miles per gallon for vehicles on the road would also tend to reduce oil use.

The net effect of all of the changes is that US oil consumption is down significantly since its high point in 2005. Figure 12, below,  shows an enlarged view of recent oil consumption.

Figure 12. Recent US oil consumption, in Btus. Amounts graphed are the same as are shown in Figure 4 above.

A  comparison of Figures 9 and 12 shows that refinery capacity was increasing at the same time that US oil consumption was decreasing. If we have more refinery space than we need, refiners can import crude oil, refine it, and sell the products as exports. That is pretty much what has been happening recently.

A few things have happened in the past few years that have made US refinery capacity especially attractive:

1. The US has a good supply of “complex” refineries that can process heavy sour crude oil. There is relatively more heavy sour crude being produced now, than previously, raising demand for these refineries.

2. The US has a low price for natural gas, compared to the rest of the world. Natural gas is used in refining heavy, sour crude oil, so our cost of refining has been relatively lower than other locations with similar facilities.

3. The amount of sulfur that is permitted in diesel and other fuel is being regulated in the US and elsewhere, to control pollution. If a country wants to have at least some fuel that meets international regulations, it now needs to find a refinery with complex capacity to remove the sulphur from its crude oil. Many countries do not have such refineries of their own. For example, Mexico sends us oil to refine, and we send oil products back to Mexico.

9. Why do I keep reading so much about “barrels of liquids,” when talking about US oil supply?

The US government likes to talk about “barrels of liquids” because comparisons with other countries are more favorable on this basis than they are using Btus, or considering crude oil only. If we look at a breakdown of US “liquids” production through 2011, this is what we see:

Figure 13. US oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

I noted above that US oil consumption is approximately 18.5 million barrels a day. If  liquids production is about 10 million barrels a day (shown in Figure 13 above), then a comparison of production on this basis would leave a shortfall of “only” a little more than 8 million barrels a day. So even on this basis, we are still a long way from being a net oil exporter.

The problem in making a comparison on a volume (barrels-per-day) basis is that very dissimilar liquids are being combined.  Both NGPLs (natural gas plant liquids) and “other liquids” (mostly ethanol) have only 60% to 70% of the energy content of crude oil. It is doubtful that “refinery gain” adds much energy content at all. The EIA has made adjustments for differences in energy values in its calculations on a Btu basis.

For those interested in finding data on a Btu basis, the Total Energy section of EIA reports gives data on this basis. They are also available (with a lag) in International Energy Statistics.

Note:

1. It is easy to confuse “net oil exporter” with “net oil product exporter”. We can think of net oil exports as the combination of the following four items:

a. Crude oil imports
b. Crude oil exports (virtually zero in the case of the US)
c. Oil product imports (like gasoline and diesel)
d. Oil product exports (like gasoline and diesel)

Net product exports reflect only the combination of Items c and d, omitting consideration of Items a and b.

In 2011, the US became a net oil product exporter. This means that when Items c and d were combined (in other words, omitting consideration of crude oil imports), we exported more oil products than we imported. This situation can happen very easily, if we are importing a lot of crude oil, and have excess refinery capacity.

Are We Prepared if Saudi Oil Production Collapses?

Iranian threats to block oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, if acted upon, could disrupt the global energy supply and cause oil prices to spike. However, as this report suggests, this scenario is relatively short term. It leaves the oil-producing infrastructure intact, and prices would stabilize if military action, led by the United States, and a coordinated international response successfully restore security to the sea-lanes.

However, policymakers need to consider a more dangerous scenario: the collapse of Saudi Arabia’s oil production caused by a massive social upheaval like those that have toppled regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

Read more

I’m not a scientist – anyone know if this is real?

So much for the sanctions. When countries want/need oil they will find a way to get it.

LONDON: Iran is concealing the destination of its oil sales by disabling tracking systems aboard its tanker fleet, making it difficult to assess how much crude Tehran is exporting as it seeks to counter Western sanctions aimed at cutting its oil revenues.

Most of Iran’s 39-strong fleet of tankers is now “off-radar” after Tehran ordered captains in the National Iranian Tanker Co. to switch off the black box transponders that are used in the shipping industry to monitor vessel movements, oil industry, trading and shipping sources said.

h/t ASPO Deutschland

Guest post by Gail Tverberg of Our Finite World

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) recently released full-year 2011 world oil production data. In this post, I would like show some graphs of recent data, and provide some views as to where this leads with respect to future production.

World oil supply is not growing very much

Figure 1. World crude oil and other “liquids” supply has dropped below the 1983-2005 trend line in recent years. Actual data is from EIA International Petroleum Monthly, through December 2011.

The fitted line in Figure 1 suggests a “normal” growth in oil supplies (including substitutes) of 1.6% a year, based on the 1983 to 2005 pattern, or total growth of 10.2% between 2005 and 20011. Instead of 10.2%, actual growth between 2005 and 2010 amounted to only 3.0% including crude oil and substitutes.

The shortfall in oil production relative to what would  have been expected based on the 1983-2005 growth pattern amounted to 4.7 million barrels in 2011. This is far more than any country claims as spare capacity. This is no doubt one of the reasons why oil prices are as high they are now. These high oil prices tend to interfere with economic growth of oil importing nations.

The shortfall in growth especially occurred in crude oil. Figure 2, below, shows crude oil production separately from substitutes.

Figure 2. World oil and other liquids supply, broken out into crude and condensate, natural gas plant liquids, other liquids (mostly ethanol), and processing gain (increase in volume from refining heavy oil), based on EIA data.

Between 2005 and 2011, crude oil production rose only 0.5%. It was mostly the substitutes that grew.

 

Top Oil Producers

The top five crude oil producers in 2011, based on the new data are

  1. Russia – 9.8 million barrels a day (mbd)
  2. Saudi Arabia – 9.5 mbd
  3. United States – 5.7 mbd
  4. China – 4.1 mbd
  5. Iran – 4.1 mbd

The top five producers when substitute liquids of various kinds are included are the same countries, but in a different order. On this basis, the US also appears to be closer to catching up to the top two.

  1. Saudi Arabia – 11.2 mbd
  2. Russia – 10.2 mbd
  3. United States – 10.1 mbd
  4. China – 4.3 mbd
  5. Iran – 4.2 mbd

While substitute liquids are OK, they are not really crude oil. Natural gas liquids are the largest category. In the US, they sell for a little less than half as much as crude oil, based on the composition and costs shown in this post. On an energy content basis, they provide about 70% as much energy per barrel as crude oil.

“Other liquids” has also been growing. It is mostly ethanol, which has about 60% of the energy content of crude oil per barrel. This category also includes biodiesel, liquid fuels made from coal or from natural gas, and even a mixture of water with very heavy oil called “Orinoco emulsion“.

There is also growth in “processing gain”.  This term refers to the extra volume that is gained when long hydrocarbons of heavy oil are”cracked” into shorter molecules. The EIA assigns this growth back to the country doing the refining. The US comes out ahead in this comparison because it imports a lot of heavy oil, and uses its complex refineries to crack it into shorter chains, such as diesel fuel and gasoline. If the heavy oil imports were to go to another country with complex refineries (such as China), the processing gain would go with it.

Looking at the Top Five Oil Producers

Of the top five oil producers, only the US and China have been growing very rapidly, and  China’s growth now seems to be hitting limits. Let’s look at the five largest countries individually.

Russian Oil Production

Between 2005 and 2011, Russia’s oil production (including substitutes) grew by 7.5%. This is better than the world average of 3.0%, but still falls short of the expected growth between 2005 and 2011 of 10.2%, mentioned above, based on the 1983 to 2005 world growth pattern.

Figure 3. Russia oil and other liquids production based on EIA data.

In 2011, Russia’s crude oil production grew by 0.6%. Growth may be slowing even further in the future. Russian Economic Minister, Elvira Nabiullina, was recently quoted as saying that Russia’s possibilities for crude oil growth have been exhausted and that Russia’s oil output will stabilize at the 2011 level for the next 20 years.

Saudi Arabian Oil Production

Figure 4 (below) shows that Saudi Arabia’s oil production has not increased much on an annual basis since 2005.

Figure 4. Saudi Arabia oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Looking at crude oil only, Saudi Arabia’s production is down by 0.8% since 2005. If one includes natural gas plant liquids (mostly ethanepropane, and butane), Saudi Arabia’s oil production for the year 2011 is up by 0.6% since 2005. This is less than the world average of 3.0%.

Saudi Arabia’s oil production bounces around. Admittedly, for some individual months, Saudi Arabia has broken its own record for crude oil production, but there is no pattern of continuously increasing production, such as is needed to increase world oil supply.

United States Oil Production

US oil production is growing (total liquids supply increased by 21.2% between 2005 and 2011), but the major portion of the growth is coming from oil substitutes.

Figure 5. US oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

A comparison of the thickness of non-blue bands on the US graph with those of the world (Figure 2) and with other countries shows how disproportionate the US mixture is.

If we look at US crude oil production by area of the country, we see that while Bakken production in North Dakota has been growing, it is still a small proportion of US total production.

Figure 6. US crude oil production by area, based on EIA data.

Before the shale oil rush, the biggest growth in US oil production had been from what I have called “deepwater”(what is called “Federal Offshore” in the EIA data). This production is down by over 200,000 barrels a day in 2011, more than double the growth in North Dakota production.

The other recent area of oil production growth is Texas. While EIA data does not break the production out by field, higher production from the Eagle Ford shale and the Permian Basin are likely major contributors.

China’s Oil Production

China’s oil production plateaued in 2011, after many years of strong growth.

Figure 7. China oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Figure 7 shows that China’s oil production for 2011 slightly decreased. The Financial Times recently reported that part of the problem is an outage of over 150,000 barrels a day in the Penglai 19-3 field, which reduced production starting in September 2011, but is now coming back on line. But even apart from this, China is reported to be  struggling to find new production to offset declines in aging fields. The Financial Times calls the outlook “challenging”.

If China’s oil production fails to grow in the future, or declines, it means that China will need to import even more oil than it has in the recent past. This will put even more pressure on world oil supply.

Iran’s Oil Production

Iran is constantly in the news with discussions of more sanctions and the possibility of  cutting off Iran’s oil exports. While it is listed above as fifth in world oil production, it is almost tied with China for fourth in world oil production.

Figure 8. Iran oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Iran’s oil production hit a high point in 2005, and is down slightly from that level. Its exports are down even more:

Figure 8. Crude oil and natural gas liquids production (gray), consumption (black line) and exports (green). Data is from BP, and only through 2010. Graph from Energy Export Data Browser.

The fact that Iran’s oil production is not growing is no doubt one of the reasons it is interested in electricity production from nuclear energy.

In my view, Iran’s oil exports of over 2 million barrels a day are very much needed to maintain reasonable stability in world oil prices. We would be better off finding a different way to settle our differences with Iran than cutting off exports.

Other Areas of Interest

The North Sea has been a problem area, with declining production. EIA data does not show this grouping separate. Instead it shows data for Europe in total.

Europe has surprisingly low oil production. On a crude oil basis, Europe’s 2011 production is below that of Iran (3.4 mbd for Europe, and 4.1 mbd for Iran). With the various substitutes included, Europe’s production is approximately equal to that of China – 4.3 mbd, and slightly ahead of Iran’s at 4.2 mbd.

Figure 9. Europe oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Clearly Europe has a very serious problem with falling oil production. In 2011 alone, crude oil production was down by 8.9%, and more broadly defined liquids were down by 7.4%. Europe’s declining oil production is no doubt contributing to it financial problems.

In contrast to Europe, there are a number of bright spots with respect to world oil supply.

Canada’s oil supply is increasing:

Figure 10. Canada oil and other liquids supply, based on EIA data.

Of course, one of the issues relating to Canada is that quite a bit of the increase is from the oil sands. This production is of concern for environmental reasons.

The Former Soviet Union excluding Russia is another area where production has been increasing, at least until recently.

Figure 11. Former Soviet Union (FSU) excluding oil and other liquids supply, based on EIA data.

The graph would seem to suggest that production may have plateaued in this area, as well.

Qatar is a small country, but is showing rapidly increasing production from a small base:

Figure 12. Qatar oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Iraq is often mentioned as an area which may have increased production in the future.

Figure 13. Iraq oil and other liquids production based on EIA data.

Figure 13 shows that there really hasn’t been a huge increase in production so far. Past history is so unstable that it raises questions about Iraq’s ability to ramp up production in the future.

Libya is mentioned as having a possibility of increasing production, at least relative to the drop off in 2011.

Figure 14. Libya oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

While some increase from the 800,000 barrels a day production that EIA shows for December seems likely, it may never fully get back to its old level. A recent analysis says Oil Production Still Unstable in Libya. According to this article, security concerns are likely to hold back future investment by outside companies in Libyan production, and sluggish political decision-making is likely to hold back actions of Libya’s National Oil Company.

Various African countries are mentioned from time to time as providing new sources of production. But when we look at African production, excluding that of Libya, we see that at least so far, African production, excluding Libya, is on a plateau.

Figure 15. Africa excluding Libya oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

Brazil is also mentioned as a growth opportunity.

Figure 16. Brazil oil and other liquids production, based on EIA data.

The actual increases to date have been small, however. Crude oil production in 2011 increased by only about 51,000 barrels a day over 2010. Ethanol production decreased, so that total liquids production decreased slightly in 2011.

Conclusions

It is easy to find small opportunities where it looks possible to increase oil production, but on a world-wide basis, it appears likely that at best, very slow growth will continue. The oil production of China and Russia were previously increasing, but now seem to be hitting plateaus. Even smaller groupings, such as the FSU excluding Russia, seem to be hitting plateaus.

Future prospects for oil supply look to be worse, especially if Iranian exports are taken off line, or if there are unexpected surprises on the downside. One concern is that political disruptions may take oil production offline in additional countries. Anther is that financial disruptions (perhaps related to European debt defaults) may lead to lower oil prices, cutting off some marginal supply.

On balance, it would appear that at best oil production in the near future will be virtually flat, leading to more spiking of oil prices and greater world economic problems. Another possibility is that world production will begin to decline. The likelihood of decline would appear to be increased if more oil exporters encounter political disruptions, or if the world enters a major recession leading to an oil price decline.

Description:
“Oil Smoke & Mirrors” offers a sobering critique of our perceived recent history, of our present global circumstances, and of our shared future in light of imminent, under-reported and mis-represented energy production constraints.

Through a series of impressively candid, informed and articulate interviews, this film argues that the bizzare events surrounding the 9/11 attacks, and the equally bizzare prosecution of the so-called “war on terror”, can be more credibly understood in the wider context of an imminent and critical divergence between available global oil aupply and and global oil demand.

The picture “Oil, Smoke & Mirrors” paints is one of a tragically hyper-mediated global-political culture, which, for whatever reason, demonstrably disassociates itself from the values it claims to represent.

While the ideas presented in this film can at first seem daunting, it’s ultimate assertion is that these challenges can indeed be met and surpassed, if, but only if, we can find the courage to perceive them.

Plan B Economics Presents – The End of Civilization and the Extinction of Humanity

I try to post interesting commentaries, from other analysts, that aren’t supplied by the mainstream media. Sometimes I sneak in a snide remark or two (I used to write a lot more, before work got in the way). However, aside from my editorial slant, many don’t know what I believe.

Well, here are a few (more to come later) of my basic thoughts on our empire as it stands on the ledge considering the plunge it is about to take…in one big, wet, sloppy nutshell:

1. The world economy might be on an intermediate period of growth, despite the troubles that loom. It might not feel like much of a recovery because we’re clawing out of a deep hole, but we are moving in the right direction for now. Data supports the claim that we are in a fragile recovery. In fact, many parts of the world have experienced strong recoveries and have already surpassed previous peaks.

2. Also in the intermediate term, debt crises will flare up to wreak havoc on the growth momentum. Europe might be the epicenter for a while, but eventually focus will shift to Japan, the world’s 3rd largest economy. Japan’s debt is unsustainable. Worse, spending is largely funded by cheap borrowing from Japanese citizens who are saving less and less. Thus, as Japan is forced to compete with the rest of the world for capital rates will likely rise, exacerbating the Japanese fiscal deficit. And the death spiral begins.

Japan will likely debase the Yen (hyperinflation?) to fill the fiscal void and global liquidity could rise dramatically. Once Japan goes, all eyes will be on the US.

While this sounds wildly contradictory to #1, we have been living with a smoldering debt crisis for many years. It is quite possible that we ‘kick the can down the road’ for a few more years. We may in fact muddle through these debt crises with some combination of financial repression and real growth. Stranger things have happened.

3. Given the current trajectory, US imperialism is doomed to dilution by rising powers around the world – China, Russia and regional allegiances. Dollar hegemony will suffer as a result, accelerating the process. This will also amplify the progression of any US debt crisis. Note the pro-cyclicality of the end of empire.

4. Now for the overriding theme: the end of cheap oil. It is no coincidence that the prosperity of the 1980s and 1990s occurred while commodity prices were declining. Cheaper inputs means fatter profit margins, providing the impetus for growth.

In 2002 the oil price was about $20bbl for WTI. Today it is around $100bbl. And what has the past decade brought? We may still have oil, but the cheap stuff is vanishing fast. When Saudi Arabia reveals its true reserves the world will see who has been swimming naked. EVERYONE.

The Western world mainlines cheap oil; without it industrialization and civilization easily falls apart. The gains of the past 200 years are based on the discovery of increasingly efficient sources of energy. Those gains include the following: mass agriculture, transportation, plastics, pharmaceuticals, electronics, mining and refining of other commodities, electricity production (because oil is used in coal mining, dam maintenance, gas extraction processes), mass communications, mass production, imported goods, and so on. Oh, and everything gets way more expensive. This doesn’t mean that all these things vanish – it just becomes scarce, which is worse.

In the battle between physics and economics, physics always wins. But this won’t stop mankind from going down without a fight. We will try to borrow and print our way out – as we have throughout modern history. We will also keep the rest of the world from accessing what many neoconsevatives believe is rightfully ours.

This should not come as a shock – the Anglo-American alliance has done this for over a century. Nevertheless, our efforts will be wasted and with it the resources needed to bridge to a new source of energy. For we live in a world in which it takes energy to get energy.

Those who build self-sufficiency now will survive best. Those who feed their black crack addiction with debt accumulation, conspicuous consumption and a paper-pushing career will suffer most.

More later…



h/t ASPO Deutschland

Do you worry about an energy shortage, a nuclear accident, or a severe economic hit? Welcome to Japan, which is dealing with all three, following the deadly Tsunami and nuclear accident in March 2011.

Source: Robert Rapier, Consumer Energy Report

Question: when will Canada be added to the “Axis of Evil” list? Or is Canada already quietly occupied via NAFTA?

Someday we might all be retro-fitting our cars:

Fukushima: A potential global disaster waiting to happen

Asahi TV: “Unbelievable” — If Unit 4 pool gets a crack from quake and leaks, it would be end for Tokyo -Expert — Doesn’t have to be large tremor, already shaken many times

Caldicott: “If Spent Fuel Pool No. 4 collapses I am evacuating my family from Boston”
Video Title: Dr. Helen Caldicott: What We Learned From Fukushima
Source: PirateTV Seattle
Date: April 2, 2012

Martenson Interviews Khosla Ventures:

Richard Heinberg examines the ongoing financial crisis, explaining how and why it occurred, and what we must do to avert the worst potential outcomes. Describes what policymakers, communities, and families can do to build a new economy that operates within Earth’s budget of energy and resources. Heinberg argues we can thrive during the transition if we set goals that promote human and environmental well-being, rather than continuing to pursue the now-unattainable prize of ever-expanding GDP.

Attend the full 9hr conference…free…and from the comfort of your home or office.

Description:
The Club of Rome and the Smithsonian Institution’s Consortium for Understanding and Sustaining a Biodiverse Planet are hosting a symposium on March 1, 2012 to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the launching of Limits to Growth, the first report to the Club of Rome published in 1972. This book was one of the earliest scholarly works to recognize that the world was fast approaching its sustainable limits. Forty years later, the planet continues to face many of the same economic, social, and environmental challenges as when the book was first published.

The morning session will start at 9:00 a.m. and will focus on the lessons of Limits to Growth. The afternoon session will begin at 1:45 p.m. and will address the difficult challenges of preserving biodiversity, adjusting to a changing climate, and solving the societal issues now facing the planet. The symposium will end with a thought-provoking panel discussion among the speakers on future steps for building a sustainable planet.

MIT recently re-visited the classic and controversial 1972 book, The Limits to Growth, which predicted the slow demise of industrial civilization as we know it. Apparently, we’re right on target!

Forty years after its initial publication, a study called The Limits to Growth is looking depressingly prescient. Commissioned by an international think tank called the Club of Rome, the 1972 report found that if civilization continued on its path toward increasing consumption, the global economy would collapse by 2030. Population losses would ensue, and things would generally fall apart.

Source

What was the message of the Limits to Growth?

Matt Simmons whitepaper on the Limits to Growth

Richard Heinberg: Beyond the Limits to Growth


Guest post by Robert Rapier @ The Oil Drum

Posted by Robert Rapier on April 4, 2012 – 11:16am
Topic: Supply/Production

The Difference Between Oil Shale and Oil-Bearing Shale

People are often confused about the overall extent of U.S. oil reserves. Some claim that the U.S. has hundreds of billions or even trillions of barrels of oil waiting to be produced if bureaucrats will simply stop blocking development. In fact, in a recent debate between Republican candidates contending for Gabrielle Giffords’ recently vacated House seat, one candidate declared “We have more oil in this country than in Saudi Arabia.” So, I thought it might be a good idea to elaborate a bit on U.S. oil resources.

Oil production has been increasing in the U.S. for the past few years, primarily driven by expanding production from the Bakken Shale Formation in North Dakota and the Eagle Ford Shale in Texas. The oil that is being produced from these shale formations is sometimes improperly referred to as shale oil. But when some people speak of hundreds of billions or trillions of barrels of U.S. oil, they are most likely talking about the oil shale in the Green River Formation in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming. Since the shale in North Dakota and Texas is producing oil, some have assumed that the Green River Formation and its roughly 2 trillion barrels of oil resources will be developed next because they think it is a similar type of resource. But it is not.

Although the oil in the Bakken and Eagle Ford is being extracted from shale formations, the term shale oil has been used for over 100 years to describe a very different resource. This has led some to confusion over the differences between current production in North Dakota and potential production in Colorado. The oil in the Bakken and Eagle Ford formations actually exists as oil, but the shale does not allow the oil to flow very well. This oil is properly called “tight oil“, and advances in hydraulic fracturing (fracking) technology have allowed some of this oil to be economically produced. (For more details, I discuss resources, reserves, fracking, shale gas, and oil shale in some detail in my new book Power Plays: Energy Options in the Age of Peak Oil).

The estimated amount of oil in place (the resource) varies widely, with some suggesting that there could be 400 billion barrels of oil in the Bakken. Because of advances in fracking technology, some of the resource has now been classified as reserves (the amount that can be technically and economically produced). However, the reserve is a very low fraction of the resource at 2 to 4 billion barrels (although some industry estimates put the recoverable amount as high as 20 billion barrels or so). For reference, the U.S. consumes a billion barrels of oil in about 52 days, and the world consumes a billion barrels in about 11 days.

Like the Bakken, the Eagle Ford formation in Texas consists of oil (and natural gas) in tight formations that is being accessed via fracking. The amount of technically recoverable oil in the Eagle Ford is estimated by the U.S. Department of Energy to be 3.35 billion barrels of oil.

Without a doubt, these two formations are a major factor in the current resurgence of U.S. oil production. But the Green River formation is the source of talk of those enormous oil resources — larger than those of Saudi Arabia — and it is a very different prospect than the tight oil being produced in North Dakota and Texas. The oil shale in the Green River looks like rock. Unlike the hydrocarbons in the tight oil formations, the oil shale (kerogen) consists of very heavy hydrocarbons that are solid. In that way, oil shale more resembles coal than oil. Oil shale is essentially oil that Mother Nature did not finish cooking, and thus to convert it into oil, heat has to be added. The energy requirements — plus the fact that oil shale production requires a lot of water in a very dry environment — have kept oil shale commercialization out of reach for over 100 years.

Thus, while the U.S. might indeed have greater oil resources than Saudi Arabia, U.S. oil reserves (per the BP Statistical Review of World Energy) are only about 1/10th those of Saudi Arabia. The distinction is important.

Summarizing the Definitions

To summarize, let’s review the definitions for the important terms discussed here:

Oil resource — the total amount of oil in place, most of which typically can’t be recovered

Oil reserve — the amount of oil that can be recovered economically with existing technology

Oil shale — sedimentary rock that contains solid hydrocarbons called kerogen (e.g., Green River Formation)

Shale oil — the oil that can be obtained by cooking kerogen

Tight oil — liquid hydrocarbons that are obtained by hydraulic fracturing of shale formations (e.g., Bakken Formation and Eagle Ford Formation)

Conclusion: Resources are not Reserves, and Tight Oil isn’t Shale Oil

It is pretty clear that at current oil prices, developments in the tight oil formations will continue. It is not at all clear that even at $100 oil the shale in the Green River formation will be commercialized to produce oil, although a number of companies are working on it and will continue to do so. Oil shale is commercially produced in some countries like Estonia, but it is primarily just burned for power.

In order to commercially convert the oil shale into oil, a more energy efficient method of producing it must be found (or, one would have to have extremely cheap energy and abundant water supplies to drive the process). I have heard from multiple industry sources that the energy return for producing oil from oil shale is around 4 to 1 (lower than for oil sands production), and that is before refining the oil to finished products. At this sort of energy return, oil sands will continue to be a more economical heavy oil option.

Thus, my prediction is that despite having an oil shale resource that may indeed be far greater than the oil resources of Saudi Arabia (I don’t think I have seen an estimate of Saudi’s total oil resources), the reserve will continue to be close to zero for the foreseeable future because there are still many technical hurdles to overcome to realize a scalable, commercially viable process.

Finally, I would say that if a commercially viable process for shale oil production from the Green River formation is developed, the environmental blowback will be enormous. The production of shale oil is more energy intensive (i.e., has higher carbon emissions) than for the oil sands, it has a high water requirement in a dry climate, and it is potentially a huge new source of carbon dioxide emissions.  The environmental protests that would arise in response to a growing commercial shale oil operation would make the Keystone XL pipeline protests pale in comparison.

 

Apr 042012

Good luck.

h/t Alex @ ASPO Deutschland

The following thesis was presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters of Military Art and Science.

Abstract:

This research explores how the peaking of world oil production influences the global balance of power. On the one
hand, the geological phenomenon of peaking, modeled by the Hubbert peak curve, gives the timeframe and the
evolution of oil depletion. On the other hand, the impact of energy resources on the world economy and global
balance is perceived differently in world politics. Idealism, realism and offensive realism lead to different societal
behaviors. In this context, oil, as one of the main sources of power for transportation, has a particular role to play.
In this context, the relationship between the peaking of oil and the global balance of power is scrutinized under the
lens of system theory. Therefore, a simple model describing the world is developed.

This research has found that the peaking of world oil production will increase the resources awareness of great
powers. While oil production will decline, nations will try to preserve their high level of organization. The world
politics will shift from idealism, typical of our present growing economy, to realism and offensive realism. The
economic rules will move to those of a negative sum game. As a consequence, minor geopolitical players will
have to align will great powers, to ensure minimal losses in oil supply. Finally, the great powers will wait until the
last moment to start mitigation measures against oil depletion. Indeed, a premature transition towards new sources
of energy constitutes a risk to alter their current geopolitical position.

Download the thesis paper